Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis (Part I)

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Abstract
Evidence from survival research has been supported by verified report data from reincarnation studies. Based on this collected evidence, supporters claim the survival hypothesis provides a better explanation for apparent post-mortem survival than the rival living agent psi hypothesis. There is no consensus on this issue, and many believe that efforts to bring empirical evidence to bear on survival debates have reached an impasse. An alternative psychic reservoir hypothesis proposes that information about the sentient experiences of intelligent organisms may be available to living and discarnate individuals with a certain level of psychic functioning. Studies analyzing mediumistic communications and psychic readings suggest that the source of psi cannot be unequivocally identified. A novel multiple sources of psi (MSoP) hypothesis is advanced, suggesting that aggregating diverse explanatory hypotheses with differing advantages may point the way toward some future solution in which current shortcomings may be overcome. This approach resolves the impasse between survival and living agent psi hypotheses, and has the advantage of compatibility with both reincarnation and psychic reservoir hypotheses.


Keywords: Survival hypothesis, reincarnation hypothesis, living agent, psychic reservoir hypothesis, multiple sources, psi hypothesis.

Introduction
For over a century research has produced significant volume of intriguing empirical data supporting the survival hypothesis, which posits the unceasing post-mortem existence of a person’s ante-mortem nonphysical essence in alleged disembodied form (Sudduth, 2016). According to the reincarnation hypothesis, a particular version of the survival hypothesis, some personality properties not only survive the death of a person but may join another physical body (Irwin & Watt, 2007; Matlock, 1990, 2019; cf. Stevenson, 1960a, 1960b; Shweder, 1986). Fifty years’ systematic studies have produced compelling evidence for the reincarnation hypothesis, a parsimonious and relatively exhaustive theory accounting for reincarnation phenomena (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Beloff, 1993; Slavoutski [Merlin], 2012).
Since these hypotheses share conceptual ground, the reincarnation hypothesis has reinforced the survival hypothesis (e.g., Braude, 2003; Stevenson, 1982a; Sudduth, 2016). Both have been used to address controversy surrounding survival evidence from parapsychological research, including mediumship (paranormal communication between a living agent and some discarnate entity), reincarnation, apparitions of the dead (visual, auditory, or tactile manifestations or perceptions that defy conventional objective explanation; e.g., Irwin & Watt, 2007; MacKenzie, 1982; Melton, 2001b), poltergeists (recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis; movement of objects, noise, fires, water inundations, and other physical effects of unknown causal agency; e.g., Gauld & Cornell, 1979; Maher, 2015; Roll, 1977, 2003, 2014), and psychokinesis or PK (the mind’s ability to affect physical systems without intervention from any recognized physical or energetic forces; Braude, 2002a; 2015; May & Marwaha, 2014, 2015b; Varvoglis & Bancel, 2015). The main evidence for survival, however, comes from mediumship and cases of the reincarnation type (CORTs). Mental mediumship refers to communication by a deceased’s discarnate spirit (called a discarnate or communicator) through the agency of the mind and/or body of a living person (called a medium or living agent) and may involve dramatic impersonations of the deceased (e.g., Braude, 2003; Gauld, 1983, 2005; Sudduth, 2016).

Physical mediumship involves communications from the deceased, manifesting in apparently paranormally facilitated actions, such as raps, table tilting, object movements, and “materializations” with the direct involvement of the medium (e.g., Beischel & Zingrone, 2015; Gauld, 1977; Kelly & Arcangel, 2011). Survivalists (e.g. Becker, 1993, 1995; Habermas & Moreland, 1992, 2004; Rivas, 2003) regard evidence from certain near-death experiences (NDEs), incidents reported by people who have demonstrated characteristics of death yet regain consciousness afterwards (e.g., Greyson, 2014; Ring, 2006; Van Lommel, 2010; Holden, 2009), especially those featuring veridical out-of-body experiences (OBEs), as supporting survival. OBE refers to a mental state in which consciousness and perception seem to come from an extrasomatic location (e.g., Braude, 2001; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2016), and while OBEs occur under numerous conditions, they are frequent in NDEs.

The most significant rival of the survival hypothesis has been the living agent psi (LAP) hypothesis (Braude, 2003, 2009a, 2014; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2009, 2014; 2016), formerly called the super-psi or super-ESP hypothesis, referring to an arguably unlimited “acquisition of information about, or response to, an external event, object, or influence (mental or physical; past, present, or future) in a way other than through any of the known sensory channels” (May & Marwaha, 2015a, p. 8; the term LAP will be used throughout this paper). According to the LAP hypothesis survival evidence can be explained exclusively “in terms of psychological and paranormal resources of living agents” (Sudduth, 2009, p. 167), psychic functioning involving the information exchange with discarnate and/or living persons (e.g., mental mediumship, psychic readings) and mentally facilitated physical influencing of objects (e.g., physical mediumship, poltergeists, PK). If a dying person’s brain in NDEs with an OBE-component (NDEs/OBE) can sustain conscious experience, the anomalous acquisition of information in these instances may involve LAP.

Survivalists (e.g., Almeder, 1992, 1997; Lund, 2009, 2012; Fontana, 2006, 2010) oppose the LAP hypothesis, arguing that satisfactory explanations of mediumship, reincarnation, and NDEs/OBE would require psi of limitless power, or at least more potent than that demonstrated
in spontaneous cases or controlled conditions. However, real-life psychic functioning could be significantly more wide-ranging and manageable than experimental demonstrations indicate (e.g., Braude, 2009a, 2014, 2016; Sudduth, 2013, 2014, 2016). Since the nature and the limits of psi are unknown, it is unwarranted to impose confines on psi in survival cases. It has been established that LAP cannot be refuted on theoretical grounds (Braude, 2002b, 2003; Gauld, 1983; Sudduth, 2014, 2016). Moreover, LAP is grounded in paranormal phenomena, such as ESP and PK, backed by substantial empirical research. Neither hypothesis, however, has ascendency in explaining post-mortem survival for different but compelling reasons (e.g., Braude, 2014; Sudduth, 2009, 2014). A third hypothesis, the psychic or cosmic reservoir hypothesis postulates an implicit source of anomalous information used by the living or discarnates in mediumship, CORTs, ESP studies, and psychic readings. At its root, is the conjecture that all sentient experiences of intelligent organisms are in some way accessible by an appropriate level of psychic functioning (e.g., Berger & Berger, 1991b; Fontana, 2010; Melton, 2001c).

Recent mediumship research has presented a quintessential source-of-psi (SoP) problem. Both quantitative (e.g., Beischel, et al., 2017; Rock & Beischel, 2008) and qualitative (e.g. Beischel et al., 2017; Rock, et al., 2009) findings indicate that mediums’ experiences during mediumistic communications and telepathic psychic readings with the living have qualitative differences (cf. Beischel & Rock, 2009; Jamieson & Rock, 2014; Rock & Storm, 2015). Some mediums claim they can distinguish between a) communicating with discarnates and living persons, and b) obtaining information from discarnates and a psychic reservoir, which may involve different sources of psi. The presence in mediumistic communications of discarnate psi, a psychic functioning attributed to discarnates involving ESP and/or PK, is commonly acknowledged (Sudduth, 2009, 2016). Studies also revealed that during psychic readings mediums contact what they described as “friendly” ethereal entities such as angelic beings, familiar communicators, and spirit guides.

However, along with differences, the studies also found similarities in medium’s experiences during discarnate communications and psychic readings. While these mixed results indicate that the source of psi cannot be definitively identified, they suggest a multiple sources of psi (MSOP) hypothesis, which would involve the co-functioning of LAP and psi-based processes that mediate different cognitive and/or physical manifestations of discarnates. Essentially, the MSOP hypothesis postulates the coexistence of multiple sources of psi: discarnates, living persons, and a psychic reservoir. By including the explanatory virtues, such as “simplicity, consilience, conservatism, and coherence” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 42) and compensating for the deficiencies of other hypotheses, a novel MSOP hypothesis demonstrates the potential for enhanced explanatory power and the promise of providing the most comprehensive explanation for mediumship data, anomalous processes behind psychic readings, transfer of personality aspects from a deceased to a newly born person in CORTs, psi functioning in NDEs/OBE, acquisition of anomalous information in remote viewing, and paranormal activity in poltergeists. Moreover, the MSOP hypothesis resolves the theoretical impasse between the survival and LAP hypotheses, is compatible with both reincarnation and psychic reservoir hypotheses, and enhances the prospects for future research of a broad variety of paranormal phenomena.
The Survival Hypothesis

In Western and Eastern spiritual traditions, beliefs in an afterlife, reincarnation, and eternal existence have been grounded in sacred teachings and practices, whereas Western philosophies support or oppose the idea of personal survival on theoretical and empirical grounds. Survivalists claim their hypothesis is superlative to rivals in explaining evidential data (Sudduth, 2014). Some critics (e.g., Geach, 1987; Flew 1996, 1997; Edwards, 1997a, 1997b; Rosenberg, 1998) question the validity of the evidence, maintaining that the empirical world rejects the idea or, at the very least, the plausibility of survival. Others (e.g., Braude, 2009a, 2014; Sudduth, 2014, 2016), while not denying survival, contend that the interpretation of data does not render the survival hypothesis the best explanation.

Since the end of the 19th century a number of authors (e.g., Ducasse, 1961; Murphy, 1945a, 1945b; Myers, 1903; Price 1953) systematically examined survival evidence. Empirical data supporting the survival hypothesis primarily come from mediumship, CORTs, and possibly NDEs/OBE and post-mortem apparitions (Sudduth, 2009). Common explanations for survival phenomena fall into three general categories. The first includes ordinary causes, in which information is obtained by natural means, such as cryptomnesia (unconscious recall of covertly existing forgotten memories); intentional or unintentional fraud; and human errors (e.g., faulty documenting, misperception, misinterpretation of facts, and illusions, delusions, or conscious fantasies). Although the history of paranormal research is not short of such incidents, such explanations cannot account for all thoroughly investigated cases (Gauld, 2005, 2007). Another naturalistic interpretation implies manifestations of multiple personalities caused by the dissociative functioning typical for trance-like states (e.g., Braude, 1995, 2009b; Krippner, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Roxburgh & Roe, 2011).

The second category includes explanations grounded in the belief that some significant memories and/or aspects of personality survive death. Strong evidence comes from mental mediumship, such as mediums’ displaying the alleged authentic behaviors of a discarnate personality (Almeder, 1992, 1996; Ducasse, 1961; Gauld, 2007; Lund, 2009), or from children in CORTs (e.g., Pasricha, 2019; Stevenson, 1990, 2000a, 2000b; Tucker, 2005, 2007, 2013). Survivalists (e.g., Almeder, 1996, 1997; Kelly, 2007b; Lund, 2009) have argued that such factually verifiable information cannot be obtained by normal or psi-based means. The explanations in the third category suggest that information in mediumship and CORTs is communicated on a psi basis, involving the living and the deceased. Since the limits of psi are unknown and some of its forms, such as ESP and PK have been validated experimentally, survivalist opponents (e.g., Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2014, 2016) have argued that a psi-based interpretation is equally plausible, namely that information can be communicated by a discarnate to the medium (discarnate psi) or acquired from and conveyed by living agents (LAP), including children in CORTs using ESP or PK (Gauld, 2005; cf. Irwin & Watt, 2007). According to Gauld, all paranormal explanations involve persistent philosophical, empirical, and scientific problems, discussed below.

Some (e.g., Fontana, 2006, 2010) find survival evidence convincing and believe that its abundance renders post-mortem survival empirically feasible; it is resisted on biological and philosophical grounds (Murphy, 1961; cf. Braude, 2014). The main difficulty, though, is lack of clarity or consensus about what constitutes acceptable evidence for survival (Gauld, 2005). Lund
(2009) claimed that different areas of survival research provide “a cumulative evidential weight sufficient to conclude that the survival hypothesis is probably true” (p. 217), and further, that its explanatory advantages combined with the shortcomings of the LAP hypothesis, render the survival hypothesis superior. Sudduth (2013) challenged this claim on two counts: 1) the data the survival hypothesis explains are no less implausible than those the LAP hypothesis expounds, rendering criticisms of LAP “significantly defective” (p. 283); and 2) the survival hypothesis is not “an antecedently credible hypothesis that leads us to expect observational data that are otherwise improbable” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 42). Having examined the arguments for survival based on known properties of the empirical world, Sudduth (2016; cf. Hart, 1959; Tyrrell, 1961) determined they lacked good evidence for survival.

The survival hypothesis aims to explain data for a discarnate’s continuing purpose-driven, goal-oriented, and memory-based mental processes responsive to the demand conditions in a manner characteristic of the ante-mortem personality. It presumes discarnate interactionism, a causal interface between discarnates and the physical world involving discarnates’ acquisition and communication of empirical knowledge about events in the material world, as well as creating physical effects (Sudduth, 2009). Even if discarnates inhabit a reality consistent with their needs, wants, and recollections of prior life, discarnate interactionism may not happen: discarnates may remain unaware of conventional physical reality and have no interaction with the living or other discarnates. Data for the survival hypothesis, however, relies fully on discarnate interactionism.

A scientific hypothesis is only as good as its predictive power, required for testability, and the survival hypothesis faces an essential problem: discarnate survival does not inherently lead to a rational conclusion that discarnates have effectual mental capacity to purposefully produce evidence of survival, such that any of the following may be true: 1) discarnates survive death but lack the mental abilities to causally affect material reality; 2) they retain consciousness and willing to communicate, but lack the power to do so; 3) they possess sufficient power, but do not wish to do so; or 4) they lack the power, will, and interest to communicate (Sudduth, 2014). Simply put, the mere survival of consciousness does not provide grounds for manifestation of post-mortem survival. Although a simple survival hypothesis postulating continuity of the self after bodily death does not have predictive significance, if supplemented by adequate auxiliary hypotheses, it can potentially gain predictive power (Sudduth, 2014).

According to discarnate interactionism, discarnates are intelligent beings possessing psychological properties, such as beliefs, needs, and intentions, and capable of manifesting phenomena suggestive of survival, leading Sudduth to propose the first auxiliary hypothesis that “at least some discarnate persons possess the power, desire, and intention to communicate with the living” (p. 47). Veracious data suggests that they have knowledge about the minds of living and other deceased beings, as well as of events in the physical world, Sudduth’s second auxiliary hypothesis. The paranormal nature of discarnate interactionism necessitates the discarnate psi hypothesis (Sudduth, 2009), the third auxiliary hypothesis that some discarnates demonstrate potent psi functioning allowing them to communicate with the living (cf. Braude, 2003, 2014; Broad, 1962; Gauld, 1983). All four combined represent a more robust survival hypothesis that satisfies the requirements for expecting manifestations of survival phenomena as a result of discarnate interactionism and suggests the existence of evidence for post-mortem survival in the physical world. Nevertheless, even this strengthened survival hypothesis lacks predictability
Even in the best mediumship cases, it is impossible to predict whether any discarnate will interact with the living agent, who that discarnate will be, and any particulars of discarnate communication, such as its time, form, or context. The same applies to the reincarnation hypothesis; evidential data in CORTs does not allow predictions.

Strong theoretical differences exist in the interpretation and assessment of survival evidence, as well as the analysis of essential properties of the survival hypothesis. This remains the focus of controversy. While even strengthened survival hypothesis is not sufficiently robust, it is supported by experimental studies of various paranormal phenomena.

**Survival and Reincarnation**

*Reincarnation,* “the notion that a nonphysical element of human existence not only survives but subsequently is reborn in another body” (Irwin & Watt, 2007, p. 208), has ancient and deep roots, but not until the second half of the 20th century did empirical evidence for reincarnation began to attract serious researchers (Carter, 2012; Kuhlmann-Wilsdorf, 2008; Mills, 2008). Accidental investigation of spontaneous reincarnation experiences occurred in India in the 1920s (Pasricha & Stevenson, 1987; Sahay, 1927; Sunderlal, 1924), but systematic study of CORTs only began in the early 1960s with Stevenson’s (1960a, 1960b) examining the accounts of young children who reported ostensible memories of previous lives. Stevenson introduced the reincarnation hypothesis, “not a matter of belief, but an empirical issue, based on very specific experiences and observations” (Grof, 2000, p. 235), aiming to explain them, irrespective of cultural or social background, or belief in reincarnation.

Reincarnation phenomena are usually associated with *past-life memories or experiences,* “impressions that individuals report in which they have experienced themselves as a particular person with an identity (other than their current life identity) in a previous time or life span” (Mills & Tucker, 2014, p. 305). Objective verification of past-life experiences has become the focus of CORT research (e.g., Irwin & Watt, 2007; Kelly, 2013; Mills & Tucker, 2014, 2015). In strong cases, children revealed specific, intimate details about the environment and life events of their previous personality, including the circumstances of their death (e.g., Stevenson, 1974, 1977c; 1987, 1997b, 2000a; Haraldsson, 2003; Tucker, 2007) and past relationships with their current or a totally different family (Tucker, 2008). The child did not simply exhibit knowledge, but claimed “to remember having lived a past life as some particular formerly living person” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 107, italics in original). Such memories appeared to be integral part of the child’s current personality, revealed as autobiographical narrative. In most CORTs (e.g., Haraldsson, 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Pasricha, 2008a, 2008b, 2019; Stevenson, 1974, 1977c, 1983, 1987, 2000a, 2003; Tucker, 2007, 2013), the previous personality continuously manifested for a prolonged period, to the point that the current identity was overtaken by the previous personality, rather like a long-term possession (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Stevenson 1974; Stevenson, Pasricha, & McLean-Rice, 1989) in contrast to the transient possession of mediumship (Gauld, 2005).

*Ex hypothesi,* reincarnation represents an ostensible embodied survival, circumventing some personal identity issues raised by disembodied survival (e.g., Helm, 1978; Penelhum, 1971; Purtill, 1973; cf. Broad, 1976; Braude, 2005). At the same time, the reincarnation hypothesis
does not address the physical permanence of previous personality (Beloff, 1977; Braude, 1992a), but only psychological continuity, although in some cases, discrete physical elements, such as bodily marks or birth defects, persist (e.g., Pasricha, 1998; Pasricha et al., 2005; Stevenson, 1997a). Whereas “none of this compels us to postulate a numerical identity” (Beloff, 1977, p. 764), subjectively, the link to one’s past self is memory. Thus, when in reincarnation the same mind might enliven different bodies, continuity is not an issue, and memory should be a decisive factor (Beloff, 1993). Despite an enormous body of empirical evidence, Gardner Murphy (1973) argued that children more likely possessed implicit psychic powers sufficient to utilize any form of ESP to obtain knowledge of their previous personalities. Stevenson (1977a, 1987, 1997b, 2000a, 2003) also considered the plausibility of other interpretations. Some CORTs could involve LAP rather than explanations based on the survival hypothesis (1977b), though LAP does not provide a comprehensive explanation for such cases (Rivas, 1993). Furthermore, CORTs and mediumship cases with a drop-in communicator share some strong and weak explanatory elements, as both can be interpreted on the basis of the LAP hypothesis. However, both raise a legitimate question why the medium or child using exceptional psychic abilities to paranormally acquire information chooses (consciously or unconsciously) to imitate the cognitive patterns of one specific individual. The LAP hypothesis does not offer simple and direct answer. Moreover, whereas mediums were known on numerous occasions outside sittings to demonstrate extraordinary psychic powers (Barrington, Stevenson, & Weaver, 2005; Crabtree, 2007; Gauld, 1983; Stevenson, 1977b), children in CORTs (with few exceptions) did not do so in their daily lives (cf. Lund, 2009). Besides the cognitive aspects, many CORTs provided evidence for post-mortem survival involving manifestations of specific behavioral patterns and emotional longings (e.g., Haraldsson, 1997, 2003; Pasricha, 1996, 2019; Stevenson, 1990, 2000b; Tucker, 2005, 2007), not easily explained by LAP (Stevenson, 1977b; Matlock, 2019). Analysis suggests that the reincarnation explanation for CORTs’ data is logical and consistent (Matlock, 1990, 2019) and that the reincarnation hypothesis provides the most parsimonious interpretation of the evidence (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Beloff, 1993; Rivas, 1993; Slavoutski [Merlin], 2012).

**Survival and Mediumship**

At the end of the 19th century, mediumship produced a large volume of high quality data, a “historically important component of survival research” (Irwin & Watt, 2007, p. 139), but by the mid-20th century, interest declined, probably attributable to the deadlock between the survival and LAP hypotheses (Kelly, 2010). Neither mental nor physical mediumship provides direct support for the survival hypothesis. “Evidence of survival (if any) comes from the content of the communications – the memories, personal characteristics, intellectual skills, etc., apparently displayed” (Gauld, 2005, p. 216). The medium’s involvement can range from a fully waking state, to light trance, to a deep dissociative state (trance mediumship), in which their usual personalities are seemingly replaced by that of the discarnate spirit. Along with demonstrating behaviors recognized as typical of the deceased (e.g., mannerisms, wording, articulation, humor, etc.), some forms of mediumship, such as proxy sittings, drop-in communicator, and cross-correspondences are considered strong evidence for the survival hypothesis by some (e.g., Almeder, 1992, 1996, 1997; Kelly, 2007b; Lund, 2009) but not others (e.g., Braude, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2014; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2014, 2016). In proxy sitting, the sitter or séance participant
and the medium intend to receive messages for a non-present, living third party whose personal circumstances, concerns, or wishes are unknown. In drop-in communicator cases, no one among the sitters, including the medium, expects or requests the presence of a particular discarnate whose previous life identity may or may not be recognized. Cross-correspondences were reported in a few cases, in which the identity of the communicator was verified, and goals and intentions were apparent but did not coincide with any of the sitters or medium (Richmond, 1938).

After analyzing all three types, Kelly (2010) recommended that survival investigations focus on proxy sittings to overcome the rival hypotheses impasse. Some (e.g., Braude 2003; Gauld 1983; Stevenson 1970) held that drop-in communicator cases provide the most plausible interpretation of data since sitters and medium do not expect the communicator, know nothing about their identity, and thus cannot willingly or involuntarily engage an ostensible discarnate, such that a more probable reason for contact might be a presumed need of the communicator rather than of the living (Sudduth, 2016). On the other hand, cross-correspondences may demonstrate the superiority of the survival hypothesis owing to two factors. First, the communications are intentionally structured based on intelligent design with a consistent, goal-driven source of information (Gauld 1983; Griffin 1997). Since multiple mediums, unknown to each other, receive separate messages, their meaning becomes clear only when individual messages are analyzed together. Second, this type of communication is allegedly initiated and maintained based on motivation of a deceased individual and not of living agents, individually or collectively (Kelly, 2010). Sudduth (2016), however, questioned the latter, noting that the most famous cross-correspondence communications involved three deceased members of the Society for Psychical Research, whose survivalist bias during life “arguably would have had an overriding interest in producing evidence that would be better explained by survival than by the alternatives” (p. 91). Since the content of cross-correspondence messages is extremely complex, rendering analysis difficult, their value as evidence for the survival hypothesis cannot be easily appraised (Irwin & Watt, 2007).

Survival evidence from mediums in part comes from discarnates’ veridical reports of real-world facts, including their experiences related to such data. Since discarnates lack bodies, survivalists must explain how such information is obtained without normal sensory apparatus. Disembodied persons lack the corporeal perceptual capacity allowing for the localization or spatial orientation of sensory experience, i.e., “perspectival awareness” of “things that normally can only be observed or experienced from certain points of view in space” (Braude, 2009a, p. 197). In Braude’s view, the only way survivalists can meet the challenge of discarnate interactionism in the absence of perspectival awareness is via routine clairvoyance. Studies on clairvoyance and remote viewing have demonstrated that a concrete observational locale during normal sensory processing is not necessary for an authentic awareness of material-world events. Such “non-perspectival awareness” (p. 202) is possible logically as well as empirically. A discarnate’s “awareness of physical states unmediated by the physical and sensory mechanisms” is “a paradigm instance” (p. 208) of clairvoyance that allows for either perspectival or non-perspectival awareness. So, it is reasonable that post-mortem awareness as well as discarnate psi would also be an instance of ESP. Braude proposed that “the survival hypothesis presupposes the operation of refined or frequent clairvoyance and telepathy between the deceased and the
physical world” (p. 208), thus providing explanatory merits for the survival hypothesis. Besides, including ESP in discarnate psi grounds the survival hypothesis in a sizable body of experimental and case ESP evidence – “empirical footing” (p. 206), however limited and contentious.

To qualify as acceptable evidence, mediumistic information must be specific and veridical – that is, sufficiently abundant, intimate, and exclusive, as well as independently verifiable that it has not been obtained through chance or interpreted on the basis of open-source data (Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2016). However, even after meeting these criteria, clear-cut interpretation of survival evidence is paradoxically challenging. Uniformly, the best cases contain a vexing blend of data suggestive of survival, LAP, and evident gobbledygook (Braude, 2003, Broad, 1962), complicating accurate analysis (Kelly, 2017). Descriptions of events and activities of the living, as well as their thoughts and feelings, suggest LAP and/or discarnate psi (cf. Sudduth, 2009). In LAP, the sourcing of information may not even be conscious and can involve an involuntary extrasensory contact with a living source (Anonymous, 1923; Dallas, 1924). Not surprisingly after over a century of meticulous investigations, scholars have not agreed on the superiority of any paranormal explanation for mediumistic communications.

**Survival and NDEs**

Especially since Moody’s (1975) publication of *Life After Life*, NDEs became the subject of intense debates (Agrillo, 2011). In a large number of clinical death cases, individuals reported realistic experiences of “leaving their body, entering other realms of existence, meeting deceased relatives, and having a review of their life” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 58; cf. Fenwick, 2012; Greyson, 2014; Parnia, 2013; Van Lommel, 2011b; Zingrone & Alvarado, 2009). Encounters with deceased individuals during an NDE are common (e.g., Fenwick & Fenwick, 2008, 2012; Greyson, 2010a; Kelly et al., 2007). Often the identity of the deceased or fact of their death unknown to the NDEr was later verified (Greyson, 2010a; cf. Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Kelly, 2001; Rousseau, 2012), refuting the “expectation hypothesis” (that the visions are hallucinations triggered by the NDErs’ expectation).

Many eminent scholars (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Beauregard, 2012; Greyson et.al, 2009; Holden, 2009; Parnia, 2013; Van Lommel, 2010, 2011a) claimed that NDEs provide strong evidence of survival. Critics (e.g., Blackmore, 1993, 2007; Braithwaite, 2008; Craffert, 2015a; Mobbs & Watt, 2011; Nelson, 2017; Woerlee, 2005) have argued on a physicalist basis that death-state neurophysiology can account for these subjective experiences, lending no support for the survival hypothesis, though notably none of their arguments can account for all of the data. A number of studies analyzed NDEs to support the survival hypothesis (Cook [Kelly] et al., 1998; Kelly et al., 1999-2000; Kelly, 2001), specifically that three commonly reported characteristics present in the same experience would be necessary and sufficient to provide evidence for survival: 1) enhanced mentation, such as clarity and lucidity of cognition and heightened perceptual vividness when mental and physiological functioning are significantly compromised; 2) OBEs; and 3) paranormal perceptions allowing access to phenomena beyond the reach of normal senses, typically inaccessible in normal consciousness.
Brain functioning during an NDE might vary from considerably reduced cognition to no measurable activity (Sudduth, 2016). Nevertheless, many NDErs have reported full and even enhanced cognitive operations while clinically dead (Kelly et al., 2007; Van Lommel, 2010). Clinical death is characterized by body-wide circulatory insufficiency, respiratory failure, and lack of electrical brain activity and brainstem reflexes, caused by cessation of effective heart function (e.g., Greyson 2010b; Quigley, 2011). While people experiencing clinical death may still be reanimated (e.g., Engmann, 2014), unsuccessful resuscitation results in brain or biological (irreversible) death (Craffert, 2015a; Engmann, 2014). Even flat EEG readings during NDEs do not necessarily indicate total cessation of brain functioning (Braithwaite, 2008); consequently, it is impossible to affirm that during NDE “there is no residual activity going on in the brain that could be the locus for the experiences” (Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019, para 4; cf. Borjigin et al., 2013; Chawla et al., 2009). The brain showing no measurable neurophysiological activity can still acquire and retain meaningful information, indicating that consciousness may continue during clinical death. Based on that, critics question whether “temporary” death is relevant to the survival hypothesis.

Considering the experiént’s moribund physical condition, NDEs/OBE are deemed essential as they often involve unexpected and unusual psycho-emotional experiences, during which some people demonstrated veridical knowledge about distant places and events unattainable through normal senses (e.g., Braude, 2001; Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Kelly et al., 2007). Verified reports of incidents happening to or around the clinically dead NDEr are frequent (e.g., Bellg, 2015; Greyson, 2007a, 2009, 2010b; Holden, 2009, 2017; Rivas et al., 2016) and defy conventional explanation (e.g., Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Sartori et al., 2006; Sharp, 1995). “Apparently non-physical veridical perception” (Holden, 2017, p. 79, italics in original) while the brain is incapacitated challenge physicalist NDE hypotheses.

An OBEr’s impression that their consciousness has separated from their body can be so convincing, they may truly believe that it can survive death (Gauld, 2005). However, even in conjunction with NDEs, OBEs are not direct evidence for survival (Griffin, 1997), and no consensus exists (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Alvarado, 2001; Paterson, 1995; Woodhouse, 1994). Thus, Braude (2001) asserted that the survival argument in “its most careful and plausible form” (p. 87) still renders the connection between OBE and survival questionable. From the neuroscientific perspective, OBEs are seen as brain phenomena possibly “caused by a functional disintegration in lower-level multisensory processing (vestibular, proprioceptive, tactile, and visual information)” (Büning & Blanke, 2005, p. 346; Blanke & Arzy, 2005). The neurophysiological mechanisms in some altered states of consciousness may produce the “undercontrol of the usual sensory and perceptual processes” (Gabbard & Twemlow, 1984, p. 238; cf. Saavedra-Aguilar & Gómez-Jeria, 1989), resulting in unexpected OBE imagery.

Some (e.g., Gauld, 2005; Braude, 2003; cf. Cheyne & Girard, 2009; De Ridder et al., 2007; Mobbs & Watt, 2011) considered OBEs merely extensive hallucinations, imaginative productions of creative mind, suggesting that expanded paranormal awareness during OBEs may not be a result of consciousness separating from the body, but rather hallucinatory experience for acquiring information by ESP (cf. Krishnan, 1985). Hasker and Taliaferro (2019) concurred. Hallucinations mediating psi-based information acquisition may manifest similar to dreams, visions, spontaneous imagery, and altered states of consciousness. Anecdotal and experimental
evidence indicates that some non-ordinary states are psi-conducive (e.g., Braud, 1975, 1978, 2002b; Carpenter, 2015; Rock et al., 2013; Tressoldi et al., 2010). OBEs are also believed to provide evidence of psychic functioning, such as clairvoyance and remote viewing. The assessment of veridical perception in NDEs/OBE has been complicated by reliance on retrospective studies without appropriate control procedures, and a few prospective studies with visual targets hidden in projected locations failed to produce any evidence (Greyson, 2014; cf. Craffert, 2015a; Parnia et al. 2014; Trent-von Haesler & Beauregard, 2013), perhaps attributable to the dying person’s lack of incentive to examine and remember targets designed by researchers. Proponents of non-local consciousness (e.g., Kelly, 2007a; Kelly, 2007; Weiss, 2015) believe that the mind, personality, or self may not be dependent on the body’s limitations in any case, an argument too complex for treatment here. Suffice to say, substantial theoretical and empirical data (e.g., Beauregard, 2012; Fenwick, 2012; Greyson, 2010b; Holden 2009, 2017; Parnia, 2014; Trent-von Haesler & Beauregard, 2013; Van Lommel, 2006, 2011a, 2013) suggests “ontological autonomy of consciousness” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 47). Since there are sufficient grounds to suppose that NDEs/OBE are genuine and veridical, it is rational to assume that they represent post-mortem continuity of consciousness (Dell’Olio, 2010). Current methodologies do not confirm neurophysiological hypotheses accounting for NDEs (Greyson, 2014), certainly not that NDEs are dependent on such mechanisms (Greyson, 2013; Kelly et al., 2007). Moreover, important data incongruent with the mainstream physicalist paradigm have been frequently ignored, and brain-related psychopathology is qualitatively different from NDE phenomenology (Greyson, 2007b), rendering neurobiological explanations of NDEs speculative at best (Facco & Agrillo, 2012; Fracasso & Friedman, 2011).

At the same time, evidence for mind-body separateness essentially is nonexistent or at the very least inconclusive (e.g., Braithwait, 2008; Long & Perry, 2010; Laws & Perry, 2010). Due to the extremely short time during which NDEs are believed to occur, hypothetically the mind could become dissociated from the brain, “but cannot survive for long in the absence of neuroanatomical structures” (Agrillo, 2011, p. 8). No matter how compelling the claim of non-locality of consciousness, it does not lead to or warrant the assumption that the mind can survive biological death (e.g., Engmann, 2014; Greyson, 2014; Potts, 2002; Craffert, 2015a, 2019). An argument that NDEs/OBE at most can identify only unconventional or paranormal methods of information access and retrieval is concurrent with the supposition that consciousness relies on the functioning of active brain (Ducasse, 1961; cf. Borjigin et al., 2013; Craffert, 2015a; Irwin, 2014). It is still not improbable that veridical NDEs/OBE could indirectly support the survival hypothesis (Braude, 2003; Sudduth, 2016) or offer supplemental support in conjunction with evidence from mediumship and CORTs (Braude, 2003; Kelly et al., 1999-2000).

**Survival and Apparitions of the Dead**

Apparitions of the dead, a focus of early survival research, have been considered “second in importance only to the best medium-produced material as proof of survival” (Moore, 1981, p. 127; cf. Fontana, 2010). Traditionally, the so-called spirit hypothesis suggested that apparitions represent an essential aspect of post-mortem existence, involving principles (e.g. Hart, 1956, 1959, 1967; Crookall, 1970) similar to those behind the NDEs/OBE, further inferring unceasing post-mortem existence of the esomatic (out-of-body) aspect (Irwin & Watt, 2007). However,
commonly reported descriptions of fully clothed apparitional figures have challenged the spirit hypothesis (e.g., Ducasse, 1961, 1969; Griffin, 1997; Moore, 1981), as have the unconvincing results of experimental studies employing apparition-detecting equipment (e.g., Maher & Hansen, 1992, 1995). Today most parapsychologists have rejected the spirit hypothesis (Irwin & Watt, 2007; Maher, 2015).

According to Paterson (1995), post-mortem apparitions represent transitory manifesting figures that strongly resemble the ante-mortem deceased, demonstrating their survived minds’ continuity. Some scholars (e.g., Gauld, 2005; Paterson, 1995; Stokes, 2007; cf. Lester, 2005) believed that the image of the deceased, as well as the conveyed information, and intent behind such communications to be the conscious or unconscious mental productions of the observer. Even when multiple observers share the same experience, the possibility of “collective” hallucination cannot be ruled out (West, 1948; cf. Moore, 1981); an acceptable account of collective cases has not yet been established (Irwin & Watt, 2007).

Providing accurate information initially unknown to the witness points to involvement of some form of paranormal process (Griffin, 1997, Lund, 2012), suggesting two probable explanations: 1) apparitions show evidence for post-mortem manifestations of the deceased, and 2) they denote LAP functioning, involving some form of ESP (Fontana, 2010). Stevenson (1982b) concluded that collective cases (more than one person concurrently witnessing the same apparition at the same place) and reciprocal cases (when a living person is perceived as an apparition and the latter confirms afterwards that it saw the observer at the same place; Lester, 2005) along with apparitional characteristics, such as reflections in mirrors and gesticulation, are less likely to be explained by ESP. He also argued that ESP is not probable in manifestations showing “the purposiveness of the deceased” (Lester, 2005, p. 172) because when such purpose is representative of the apparent person rather than of the observer or other living individuals, it suggests the survival hypothesis, not the overcomplicated and perplexing explanations offered by LAP (Lund, 2009).

Both the survival and LAP hypotheses would involve a high level of psychic functioning, namely, discarnate psi (Lund, 2009; Sudduth, 2016). If veridical cases can be explained by discarnate psi, then the sufficiently credible apparitional theory must include the interactive performance of the deceased (Griffin, 1997) that may entail some form of ESP-based input from them (e.g., Becker, 1993; Griffin, 1997; Paterson, 1995), a proposal that can neither be empirically corroborated nor refuted (Lester, 2005). If on the other hand, some aspect of the apparition happens to have such input, “the stream of consciousness of the deceased person persists after death” (p. 168). Some survivalists (e.g., Lund, 2009; Myers, 1892) claimed that apparitional phenomena involve post-mortem psychological continuity of an ante-mortem mind, implying discarnate consciousness (Irwin & Watt, 2007).

Paterson (1995) proposed a mechanism behind the discarnate psi functioning in apparitional cases: an imaginary construct or hallucinatory representation of an apparitional figure is sourced from the deceased’s mind and telepathically transmitted to the observer’s mind. This could account for explicitly or implicitly passing on factual information to the living, as well as for the manifestation of identifiable figure of the deceased, the essential feature of the experience. It is not unreasonable to expect that a psychologically healthy individual’s mind would construct and
retain, not necessarily consciously, their ante-mortem body image. If, based on the survival hypothesis, a significant aspect of deceased’s consciousness containing just basic psychological structures survives, then their body image also survives, although in some discarnate form. Similar to that of the living, this body image would comprise mentally reconstructed memory of physical, psychological, and behavioral characteristics. Since in the post-mortem state “its ontological status, as in life, would be mental” (p. 48), it can be projected telepathically to the minds of the living, with the same effort as any other essential aspects of the deceased’s mind.

Historically, some apparition theories were congruent with the survival hypothesis (e.g., Crookall, 1970; Gurney et al., 1918/1962; Hart, 1956, 1959; Myers, 1889-1890, 1892). Recently, opinions have been more cautious or even strongly critical. Survivalists (e.g., Carter, 2012; Laszlo, 2014; Paterson, 1995) have argued that evidence suggests the reality of post-mortem apparitional functioning and presents “obvious proof of an apparition of a dead person being ‘real’” (Lester, 2005, p. 170, author’s emphasis). Paterson (1995) considered apparitional experiences of the dead authentic, and from the survival hypothesis perspective, veridical, proposing their significance for post-mortem survival based on: 1) number of sightings; 2) dependability and overdetermination of witness statements; 3) environmental awareness exhibited by apparitions; 4) demonstrated purposeful behavior; and 5) the truth of communicated information unknown to the observer at sighting but later verified. Since reciprocal apparitions have much in common with apparitions of the dead, they may also provide a reasonable support for survival (Lund, 2009). Stevenson (1982b) suggested that collective cases, post-mortem apparitions with evidence of purpose, and reciprocal cases provide stronger support for the survival hypothesis, though relatively scarce. According to Paterson (1995), the evidence from apparitions is definitely stronger than mediumship evidence of discarnates.

On the other hand, apparition reports as evidence of survival are problematic: the majority are outdated; many are based on earlier memories, which could be inaccurate and distorted; and the vast majority come from ordinary people, lacking skills and experience in experimental research (Lester, 2005). Besides inadequate specificity and veracity, the investigations based on these reports are statistically insignificant due to their small sample. The hypothesis of post-mortem mind continuity, allegedly demonstrated by apparitional phenomena, lacks robust empirical evidence and, compared to other sources, apparitions offer the weakest evidence for survival.

The LAP Hypothesis

Early psychical researchers were aware of the problems with evidence for survival (e.g., Crabtree, 2007; Braude, 2003, 2014; Krippner et al., 2013; Sudduth, 2009, 2014, 2016). For example, Flournoy (1900, 1911/2007) deemed mediums capable of creating imaginative personalities and dramatizing their narratives via automatisms. Later he believed telepathy was significantly involved in mediumistic communications and ultimately introduced the LAP hypothesis (Crabtree, 2007; cf. Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2009; 2014, 2016). Mediums’ exceptional psychic abilities, including telepathy and clairvoyance, beyond séance settings, contributed to its advancement (Crabtree, 2007; cf. Barrington et al., 2005; Gauld, 1983; Stevenson, 1977b). According to the LAP hypothesis, mediumistic communications include a “Super-ESP Component,” mediums’ sufficient ESP powers to access and retrieve any information related to
the deceased, and a “Superplasticity Component,” their unconscious ability to embody and dramatize this paranormal information to realistically portray the deceased (Crabtree, 2007, p. 360, italics in original). Braude (1989, 1992b, 2003) made “the most empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated” effort to advance a robust LAP hypothesis (Sudduth, 2016, p. 271) whose explanatory power is enhanced by some psychological expounding component (cf. Ducasse 1961; Hart 1959; Lund 2009; Stevenson 1974), which can account for a broader scope of evidence, including impersonations.

Survivalists nevertheless argue that LAP has little or no explanatory power concerning the variety of abilities demonstrated by mediums and some children in CORTs: First, LAP is limited to propositional knowledge, “the articulation of facts or items of information (often called ‘knowledge-that’)” and unable to account for applied knowledge, “the manifestation of abilities and skills (usually considered a type of ‘knowledge-how’)” (Braude, 2003, p. 9, italics in original); Second, the development of skills that mediums or children do not originally possess would normally require extensive learning and practicing (Sudduth, 2014; cf. Braude, 1992a, 1992b, 2003; Stevenson, 1977c, 1987, 1992, 2000a). However outside survival, dissociative experiences, such as dissociative identity disorder, commonly involve the spontaneous exhibition of previously unknown cognitive patterns and behaviors, such as extraordinary language skills, artistic abilities, and musical talents (e.g., Moline, 2013; Putnam, 1989; Ross, 1997). This does not imply that mediums or children in CORTs attained those abilities through LAP. There is no indication that those skills “have been transferred or acquired, only that novel skills are suddenly manifested without any obvious antecedents,” which studies in abnormal psychology confirm (Sudduth, 2014, p. 55, italics in original).

According to Braude (2003, 2014) and Sudduth (2014), the robust LAP hypothesis involves the “motivated-psi” hypothesis, “the operation of psychic abilities in the services of some agent's genuine or perceived needs and interests” (Braude, 2003, p. 13, italics in original). In this enhanced hypothesis, psi offers an alternative source of autobiographical information about the deceased. Motivation or psychodynamic function of psi can explain both why living agents seek such information and the impression that the deceased is the source of this information. The robust LAP hypothesis endorses the semblance of survival, allowing this function of psi to stimulate conscious or unconscious dominant drives within living individuals. When the motivated-psi hypothesis includes “motivational and dissociative psychodynamics” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 56), it becomes a robust LAP hypothesis.

In the best cases, mediums possess factual, exhaustive, and personal knowledge about the ante- and post-mortem existence of the deceased, “a composite of information the individual elements of which are located in independent sources (persons or documents)” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 58). Survivalists argue that, if LAP accounts for the medium’s knowledge from multiple sources, it must be of super-psi magnitude. Though nothing is known about the actual ability of psi to handle multiple sources of information, experimental studies (Kennedy, 1980; Schmidt, 1987; cf. Schmidt, 1975, 1984) have shown that psi appears to be immune to task complexity. Thus, “psychically accessing multiple sources . . . [is] no more imposing than accessing one” (Braude, 2014, p. 29). Besides, the assumption that LAP functioning is similar to conventional sequential information processing is entirely speculative (Sudduth, 2014).
Assuming psi overcomes task complexity and its functioning based exclusively on effective wish fulfillment, the streamlined agent’s psychic activity Braude (2003) called the “magic wand hypothesis” (p. 11), it still would not escape an “argument from crippling complexity” (p. 86, italics in original; cf. Sudduth, 2014). Because psi is presumed to function in an environment of interconnected wide-ranging psi and non-psi activities, its operations are believed to be affected by a variety of explicit, implicit, local, and global interferences. To surpass these hindrances, psi must continuously demonstrate exceptional strength. Effectively functioning psi, regardless of its power is involved in multiple activities, which may cause its operations occurring elsewhere to be compromised. Therefore, besides needing to be isolated from external non-psi noise, psi requires sufficient power to overcome its own diminishing psychic effects. The excessive power, however, can obstruct its various manifestations, and thus, the overly powerful psi could become self-sabotaging. The argument of crippling complexity implies that ultimately, LAP “may not be unlimited and indeed may not even have the required degree of potency and refinement” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 60, italics in original; cf. Braude 2003) to acquire detailed, veridical information about the ante- and post-mortem existence of the deceased.

Although crippling complexity challenges the explanatory power of the LAP hypothesis, it does not indicate the superiority of the survival hypothesis. The scope and sophistication of psi functioning involved in discarnate psi, which the survival hypothesis requires, is no different from what LAP needs to account for the same data (Braude, 2003, 2009a; Sudduth, 2009, 2014, 2016). If the argument of crippling complexity imposes confines on psi in an attempt to eliminate its self-sabotaging behavior, then it would also limit discarnate psi, which would reduce the explanatory power of the survival hypothesis for mediumship evidence. While maintaining that certain data might better support the survival hypothesis, Braude (2003) believed that the robust LAP hypothesis retains considerable merit.

The Psychic Reservoir Hypothesis

The plausibility of the LAP hypothesis suggests that psi may be involved in psychic functioning posited by both the survival and psychic reservoir hypotheses (Rock, 2014). The latter is based on the premise that information about all sentient experiences of intelligent organisms is retained in some putative implicit depository of unknown nature and location. When applied to sourcing paranormal information (e.g., in mediumship, CORTs, ESP studies, or psychic readings), this hypothesis considered an alternative to the survival and LAP hypotheses (e.g., Beischel, 2014; Fontana, 2010; Rock & Storm, 2015). Since it cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified; and having no supporting empirical evidence, it has less explanatory power than other two hypotheses.

The first reference to a cosmic data repository in the context of mediumship is attributed to William James who, among other possibilities, considered “access to some cosmic reservoir, where the memory of all mundane facts is stored and grouped around personal centers of association” (1909, as cited in Leuba, 1915, p. 412; cf. Tymn, 2011). However, a concept of a collective memory store known as the Akashic Record has existed for millennia (Chaney, 1996; Krippner, 2006). Akasha is often translated as space or ether and in Hindu philosophy represents one of the two fundamental entities of the universe, the subtle substance from which all creation emerged (Vivekananda, 1996; cf. Krippner, 2006; Laszlo, 2014). In Indian tradition, the Akashic
Record is also called *Mahat*, or cosmic mind and is said to contain records of all events, thoughts, and actions happening everywhere in the universe through all time. It may be accessed by *yogis* in an advanced meditative state, by *rishis* or Vedic seers, and descriptively similar experiences have been reported by psychics in altered states of consciousness (e.g., Laszlo, 2014; Melton, 2001a; Panda, 2013; Rao, 2011).

Although it is believed that recordkeeping is effected by the permanent impression of information upon akasha, the actual mechanisms are unknown. No theory claiming to offer scientific basis for such a construct was known until the late 20th century when Laszlo (2007, 2008, 2012, 2016; cf. Chaney, 1996; Grof, 2006) expanded it into “an interconnecting, information-conveying, and conserving cosmic field” (Szabo, 2017, p. 95), “augmented continuously by quantum holographic information” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 229); however, such theories remain speculative. The Akashic field is believed by some to possess indelible memory of the universe with unlimited capacity (Szabo, 2017). Information obtained by various forms of ESP have been theorized to be an integral part of this cosmic data field (Berger & Berger, 1991a, 1991b; Krippner, 2006).

The psychic reservoir hypothesis, however, lacks two important explanatory virtues, conservatism and consilience (Sudduth, 2014). It arguably is based on the incomprehensible – at least from the Western scientific perspective – idea that essential data are “stored in a structure, independent of any context” (Rock & Storm, 2015, p. 571). At the same time, compared to the survival and LAP hypotheses, it offers a single, direct, and universal source of information; does not require the existence of an afterlife; does not necessitate explaining what exactly survives bodily death, including survival and reincarnation mechanisms; avoids LAP’s needing super-psi quality; and circumvents the issue of crippling complexity in LAP functioning. Jamieson and Rock (2014) found this hypothesis helpful in demonstrating the qualitative difference between agentive and non-agentive sources of psi.

(Continued on Part II)