The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction

Abstract

The assumption that all behavior is ultimately neurophysical may be called the Standard Model (SM) of neuro­phil­oso­phy. Yet, in the years since David Chalmers distinguished the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the easy problems of neuroscience, no progress has been made toward a physical reduction of consciousness. This, together with collateral shortcomings Chalmers missed, show that the SM is inadequate to experience. I outline the logical prerequisites for reduction and show that they are missing from the SM. Their absence is traced to representational problems implicit in: (1) The Fundamental Abstraction of natural science (attending to the object to the exclusion of the subject); and (2) The limits of a Cartesian conceptual space. Adding pre-Cartesian concepts allows us to construct an integrated representation bridging the dualistic gap. In particular, Aristotle’s projection of mind provides a paradigm integrating intentional and physical operations.