Interactionism Read Anew: A Proposal Concerning Phenomenal Judgments

Abstract

From a classical Cartesian perspective, interactionism implies the transfer of thoughts and feelings from a non-physical phenomenal consciousness to the physical brain. Thereby, phenomenal consciousness is thought to control the physical body somehow like a marionette hanging by strings of non-physical thought. Differing from this depiction, a basic premise of the current interactionist hypothesis is that the non-physical phenomenal consciousness reflexively effects accentuation of thoughts, feelings and sensory experiences which already exist as physical brain processes. In this essay, the mentioned interactionist hypothesis is presented and central philosophical problems which pertain to it are discussed. Conclusively, the hypothesis may withstand the initial scrutiny and is thereby rendered coherent. Nonetheless, the feasibility of interactionism is not thereby significantly influenced. That would require a much more extensive treatment of the feasibility of the current hypothesis as well as of coherent solutions to numerous other problems pertaining to interactionism.