Inherent Subjectivity in Consciousness: A Functional Role of Acquaintance in Phenomenal Subjectivity (Part II)

Abstract

"Phenomenal subjectivity" may arguably be describable as a mental state of "having" experience, taking as premise that such "having" of experience cannot occur without any experiencing state. Few theorists presently believe that a purely phenomenal kind of subjectivity can be known by acquaintance. I will test as "straw man", nonetheless, a working hypothesis stating that beliefs in acquainted knowledge of such phenomenal subjectivity is possible, through acquaintance with a correspondingly subjective element within the human psyche. The working hypothesis also implies that the concept CONSCIOUSNESS is possessed variously depending on whether phenomenal subjectivity as felt to be experienced by acquaintance is "well known" to the individual. Further still, it implies that the concept I in many cases may be possessed so as to refer to phenomenal subjectivity, such as the referent phenomenon of the latter term is felt to be consciously known following acquaintance with it.

Part II of this two-part article includes: 4. The “I” and Auto –Experience; 5. Conclusion; and References.