Blink or Wink: The Indiscernibility of Willed Actions

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of indiscernibility between causally determined and non-causally determined actions, using the example of blinking and winking. It is argued that if at least one action can be either causally determined or willed, it may be impossible to reliably distinguish between the two classes of the act. A hypothetical experiment is proposed in which observers attempt to differentiate between willed and involuntary blinks in others. The paper suggests that even if subjective knowledge of willed actions exists, there may be no way to objectively distinguish them, leading to a state of incomplete objective knowledge intermingled with subjective complete knowledge. The implications of this indiscernibility are discussed in relation to the existence and influence of the will, suggesting that the will may exist and exert influence without being something about which we could have objective knowledge. It is further posited that the dependence of one thing on another does not necessitate a causal relationship, opening avenues for further exploration of free will and determinism.